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1 Introduction
Blackwell’s (1951a) theorem says Experiment I is more (Blackwell-)informative than
Experiment II if and only if Experiment I is more valuable than Experiment II for all
expected-utility (EU) maximizers.
A common critique levelled on Blackwell’s informativeness ranking is that the order
is very coarse.1 This is exemplified by how it often fails to compare experiments
with intuitively ranked information content. For instance, consider two experiments
H = ω + eH and F = ω + eF, where eH ∼ Uni f orm[−a, a] and eF ∼ Uni f orm[−b, b]
are independent from ω with 0 < a < b. It is natural to think a signal from experiment
H is less noisy than that from F, yet these two experiments cannot be Blackwell-ranked
unless b/a is a positive integer.2 As a result, Blackwell’s ranking can be too restrictive
for application.
In many economic questions related to information, the decision problem is often
not arbitrary but has a certain structure. A fruitful approach is to focus on the class
of monotone decision problems proposed by Karlin and Rubin (1956), which imposes
certain payoff complementarity between action and state. Thus, the optimal deci-
sion is monotone in some state relevant variable (Athey, 2002), which is then applied
to economic problems such as information acquisitions in auctions and production
decisions. This motivates the need for a less demanding order of information charac-
terized by the monotone decision class.
Lehmann (1988) proposes an information order that is equivalent to a higher ranked
experiment to be more valuable for all monotone decision problems, which is a nat-
ural enrichment of Blackwell’s order. Some follow-up papers apply Lehmann’s order
to economic problems and consider more primitive assumptions on the payoff func-
tions leading to the monotone decision problems. For instance, Athey and Levin
(2018) consider supermodular preferences. Quah and Strulovici (2009) examine an
even larger family of interval dominance order (IDO) preferences, which includes all
the single-crossing preferences.3
Recent experimental findings have indicated the prevalence of non-EU preferences
in decisionmaking under uncertainty.4 These findings motivate a re-examination of
1This is noted by Blackwell himself in Blackwell and Girshick (1954). See also Lehmann (1988).
2See Example 3.
3Lehmann order has been applied elsewhere in economic theory. Persico (2000) applies the notion
to information acquisition in first and second price auctions. Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) apply
to mechanism design. Jewitt (2007) applies to agency problems. Athey and Levin (2018) apply to
production with cost uncertainty. Bond (2016) applies the order to study information content of actions
or prices in financial market.
4See references in Li and Zhou (2016).
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the appropriateness of existing information order for non-EU decisionmaker (DM)s,
and particularly, uncertainty-averse DMs. For the case of Blackwell’s ranking, Çelen
(2012) and Li and Zhou (2016) consider the robustness of Blackwell’s equivalence the-
orem for maxmin EU and uncertainty-averse agents, respectively. While Quah and
Strulovici (2009) show that Experiment I is more Lehmann informative than Experi-
ment II implies the former is more valuable than the latter for any maxmin EU DM
with IDO utility indices, it is largely unknown whether the reverse statement—can
Lehamnn order be equivalently characterized by the value ranking within the IDO
family— holds for the maxmin EU family or other well-known ambiguity-averse fam-
ilies. The main goal of this paper is to provide a complete answer to this question in
the most general case of uncertainty-averse DMs.
Throughout the paper, we assume the DM can commit to any signal-contingent strat-
egy and the experiments have monotone likelihood ratio (MLR)-ranked distributions.
An immediate observation (Corollary 1), is that a more Lehmann informative ex-
periment is more valuable for all uncertainty-averse agents with vNM utility indices
observing IDO.5 Consequently, any ambiguity-averse DM à la Cerreia-Vioglio, Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011) will not choose a less Lehmann informa-
tive experiment over a more Lehmann informative one.
In Section 4, we provide two different characterizations of the reverse direction, by
exploring variation in either preferences (vNM indices) or beliefs (uncertainty-averse
indices). Theorem 1 says that, fixing an uncertainty-averse index G satisfying mild
technical assumptions, the Lehmann ranking of any pair of experiments can be dis-
tinguished by their value ranking for all single-crossing vNM utility indices. Theorem
2 says that, fixing a finite collection of indices {u1, . . . , uI} that satisfy a criterion called
diversity, the Lehmann ranking can also be detected by value ranking for at least one
vNM index in the collection as one varies the uncertainty-averse indices. To link these
two Theorems, we show that changing beliefs has the same effect as state-wise re-
weighting the vNM indices. Consequently, a one-to-one mapping between the vNM
index chosen in Theorem 1 and the prior belief chosen in Theorem 2 can be explicitly
described for the binary state case (Section 4.1).
Furthermore, in Section 5.1, we apply Theorem 2 to the social ranking of experi-
ments, by reinterpreting a diverse collection of vNM indices {u1, . . . , uI} as a society
of individuals whose ambiguous beliefs are unspecified. Then Lehmann ranking cor-
responds to the social ranking of experiments under unanimity aggregation rule in a
diverse society. To satisfy diversity, the number of individuals in a society is at least
the number of states minus one.
Our main results confirm the robustness of Lehmann’s order to ambiguity-averse pref-
5This follows directly from Blackwell (1951b) and (Quah and Strulovici, 2009). See Section 3.
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erences. The single crossing condition rules out some vNM utility indices, neverthe-
less, this family is still broad enough for many economic applications. The ambiguity-
averse preferences we consider in this paper are a very general class in the literature,
which also suggests wide applicability. Since any of the well-known ambiguity-averse
preference families6 leads to the same information rank—the original Lehmann order
that was derived in the EU case—the validity of our characterization theorem for
Lehmann’s order reveals that single-crossing utility rather than the expected utility
assumption is the key determinant of the ranking over information structures.
Also, we make a technical contribution in showing that Lehmann’s informativeness
order can be characterized by comparing the value for all single crossing utility in-
dices, i.e., the "only if" direction of the equivalence theorem. The usual proof of such
equivalence theorem, for the case of Blackwell’s order, relies crucially on the separat-
ing hyperplane theorem to find a suitable vNM index u (Blackwell, 1951a; de Oliveira,
2018; Lehrer et al., 2013). However, the same technique does not apply in our setting,
as one cannot guarantee the identified u is single crossing. Instead, for any prior with
full support, in Proposition 1, we explicitly construct a single crossing vNM index
u, which is pinned down by a suitable transformation of the prior and a few appro-
priately chosen parameters. The proof technique may be applicable to settings with
similar restrictions on the vNM indices.
We provide a formal discussion on the conditions needed for an information order
to be prior-free. As most orders on information structures can be derived from com-
paring their values for certain classes of vNM utility indices, for a Bayesian DM,
transforming the utility index state-wise has the same effect as re-weighting the prior
belief. In light of this observation, we formally prove that the corresponding informa-
tion order associated with a class of utility indices must be prior-free as long as the
class is closed under state-wise weighting and the prior considered is of full support
(Proposition 4). This result helps reconcile why classic Lehmann and Blackwell orders
are prior-free; while some other orders7 are prior-dependent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up and rel-
evant concepts. Section 3 and 4 present two characterization Theorems, followed by
two economic applications in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the key assumption, spe-
cial cases of ambiguity preferences, related literature, and relaxing the commitment
assumption. Proofs not provided in the main text are relegated to the appendix.
6That is, the maxmin EU (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), the variational preferences (Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006), the multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sargent, 2001), the confidence
preferences (Chateauneuf and Faro, 2009), the smooth preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji,
2005), and the second-order EU (Grant, Polak, and Strzalecki, 2009).
7Such as the MIO-ND order studied by Athey and Levin (2018).
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2 Framework
We first introduce the notation. Let Ω ⊆ R be a finite state space and pi ∈ ∆Ω denote
a generic prior belief. An experiment or information structure generates a signal that
is correlated with the states according to some probability. Experiments are denoted
by tuples (S, H) and (S, F), where S is the set of signals and assumed to be some
compact interval in R and H(·|ω), F(·|ω) : S 7→ [0, 1] are the cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of signals conditional on each state. Assume all H(·|ω) and F(·|ω)
have strictly positive densities h(·|ω) and f (·|ω) on S.
Let A ⊆ R be a compact action space. The DM has payoff function/vNM utility
index u : A×Ω 7→ R that depends on the action taken and the state of nature. For
all a1, a2 ∈ A, [a1, a2] is an interval of A if for all element a ∈ A such that a1 < a <
a2, a ∈ [a1, a2]. Say a vNM utility index u(·, ·) satisfies the interval dominance order
(IDO) if for all a2 > a1 and w2 > w1, if u(a2,ω1) ≥ u(a,ω1) for all a ∈ [a1, a2], then
u(a2,ω1) ≥ (>)u(a1,ω1) implies u(a2,ω2) ≥ (>)u(a1,ω2). In this paper, we consider
monotone decision problems by focusing on the vNM utility indices that belong to
the IDO family (Quah and Strulovici, 2009). A special case of the IDO preference
family is the single crossing preference family, where for all a2 > a1 and ω2 > ω1,
u(a2,ω1)− u(a1,ω1) ≥ (>)0 implies u(a2,ω2)− u(a1,ω2) ≥ (>)0.
Given an experiment (S, H), the DM can choose any measurable signal-contingent
mixed strategy σ : S 7→ ∆A.8 We use σs to denote the mixed strategy in ∆A if s
occurs. Pure strategies, mappings from S 7→ A, are denoted by φ,ψ. We are ultimately
interested in the set of monotone pure strategies, denoted Φ, in which φ(·) ∈ Φ is an
increasing function on S.
For an expected utility (EU) maximizing DM with prior pi, his EU from committing
to a strategy σ under information structure H is
UEU(H,pi, σ, u) =
∫
Ω
∫
S
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)dH(s|ω)dpi(ω) (1)
The value of information structure H is
VEU(H,pi, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
UEU(H,pi, σ, u).
Uncertainty-averse Preferences (UAP)
8Let S be the Boral σ-algebra and µ be the Lebesgue measure of S. The mixed strategy space
can be treated as a bounded subset of L∞(S,S , µ,R|A|). The dual of L1(S,S , µ,R|A|) is exactly
L∞(S,S , µ,R|A|). Endowed with the weak-* topology on L∞(S,S , µ,R|A|), the set of mixed strategy is
thus compact (recall that A is finite, and S is a compact subset of R.).
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We consider DM with uncertainty-averse preferences à la Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011),
whose ex-ante utility if he takes strategy σ is9
UUA(H, G, σ, u) = min
pi∈∆Ω
G
(
UEU(H,pi, σ, u),pi
)
, (2)
where UEU(H,pi, σ, u) is given by (1), function G : X × ∆(Ω) 7→ (−∞,+∞] is the
index of uncertainty aversion, and X ⊆ R is the range of u, which is assumed to be
unbounded either above or below.
Following Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), G satisfies the following properties: (i) G is
quasi-convex and lower semi-continuous; (ii) G(·,pi) is increasing for all pi ∈ ∆Ω;
(iii) infpi∈∆(Ω) G(x,pi) = x for all x ∈ X . The uncertainty-averse preferences are
monotone and convex. They nest most well-known ambiguity-averse preferences as
special cases.10 Let G be the family of all uncertainty-averse indices. For all pi ∈ ∆Ω,
let domG(·,pi) = {x ∈ X : G(x,pi) < +∞}. We further assume domG(·,pi) is either
empty or X for all pi.11 Let M := {pi ∈ ∆Ω : domG(·,pi) = X}, note that M is closed
and convex and is interpreted as the set of plausible priors held by the DM.12
For a UAP DM with vNM index u and uncertainty-averse index G, maximizing over
all mixed strategies, the ex ante value of the experiment (S, H) is
VUA(H, G, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
min
pi∈∆Ω
G(UEU(H,pi, σ, u),pi).
In the expression above, we assume the DM can commit to any signal-contingent strat-
egy, to abstract away from concerns about dynamic inconsistency due to ambiguity
aversion.13
Lehmann’s order
Fix an information structure {H(·|ω)}ω∈Ω. Let {F(·|ω)}ω∈Ω be another information
structure.
Assume the likelihood distributions {H(·|ω)}ω∈Ω are monotone likelihood ratio (MLR)-
ranked, that is, for any fixed ω2 ≥ ω1, h(s|ω2)h(s|ω1) is an increasing function of s.
Definition 1 (Lehmann’s order). Let function T : S×Ω 7→ S such that H(T(s,ω)|ω) =
9For expositional simplicity, we assume the minimizing probability exists; otherwise, we could just
replace min by inf and the same argument follows.
10See Section 6.3 for the six familiar ambiguity-averse families that are special cases of UAP.
11The assumption is very mild and verified in the six special cases we discuss in Section 6.3.
12Closeness follows from lower-semi continuity of G and convexity follows from quasi-convexity of
G. See Section 6.1 for detailed interpretation of M.
13See Li and Zhou (2016) for a discussion on this matter.
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F(s|ω).14 We say H is more Lehmann-informative (accurate) than F, denoted H %L F, if
T is an increasing function of ω, for each fixed s.
Figure 1 illustrates the CDFs of two experiments that are Lehmann ranked.
Figure 1: The CDF comparison of two experiments, where H is more Lehmann-
informative than F. For fixed s0, the function T(s0,ω), given by H−1(F(s0|ω)), is
increasing in ω.
Below are some examples illustrating Lehmann orders.
Example 1 (Location experiment). Suppose H(s|ω) = H0(s− ω), F(s|ω) = F0(s− ω)
for two CDFs H0 and F0. Assume both distributions have log-concave densities, then
the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is satisfied. H is more Lehmann-
informative than F if and only if 15
H−10 [F0(s
′)]− H−10 [F0(s)]
s′ − s ≤ 1, for all s < s
′.
Example 2 (Gaussian experiment). Suppose the signal is generated by adding normal
noise to the state: for each θ, the distribution of signal S = ω + ρe, where e is the
standard normal distribution N (0, 1), and parameter ρ > 0. Consider two signals H,
14The distribution functions, {H(·|ω)}Ω and {F(·|ω)}Ω, are assumed to have strictly positive densi-
ties on S, therefore they are strictly increasing in s. Hence, T is always well-defined and unique.
15See Lehmann (1988) Theorem 5.2.
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F with parameters ρh, ρ f respectively. Then
H(s|ω) = Φ¯
(
s−ω
ρh
)
, F(s|ω) = Φ¯
(
s−ω
ρ f
)
,
where Φ¯ is the cumulative distribution function of N (0, 1). Then the corresponding
T-function associated with the two signals is T(s,ω) = (1− ρhρ f )ω+
ρh
ρ f
s. Therefore, H
is more Lehmann-informative than F if and only if ρh < ρ f .16
Example 3. Suppose H(·|ω) ∼ U[ω− 12 ,ω+ 12 ], and F(·|ω) ∼ U[ω− τ2 ,ω+ τ2 ], where
U[a, b] denote the uniform distribution on the interval [a, b]. Then the corresponding
T-function associated with the two signals is T(s,ω) = τs + (1− τ)ω, and, hence,
H is more Lehmann-informative than F for any τ ∈ (0, 1). However, H is more
Blackwell-informative than G if and only if 1/τ = k for some positive integer k.17
3 More Lehmann-informative implies more valuable
In this section, we show the "if" direction of Lehmann’s equivalence for UAP DMs,
that is, a more Lehmann-informative information structure is more valuable for all
UAP DMs with IDO preferences, as long as the information structures are MLR-
ranked. The statement follows from two complete class theorems (Blackwell, 1951b;
Quah and Strulovici, 2009) and a property about Lehmann-ranked information struc-
tures shown by Quah and Strulovici (2009).
For any information structure H and strategy σ, the induced state-wise expected util-
ity vector is
uH,σ :=
∫
S
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)dH(s|ω) ∈ R|Ω|.
A family of strategies Ψ ⊆ ∆AS is an essentially complete class if for all strategy σ ∈
∆AS, there exists a strategy ψ from the family Ψ such that the expected utility vector
induced by ψ dominates that of σ state by state, i.e., uH,ψ(ω) ≥ uH,φ(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω.
By Blackwell (1951b), when there are finitely many distributions over S, where each
distribution is atomless, then the set of pure strategies forms an essentially com-
plete class. In our case, each likelihood distribution in the finite set {H(·|ω)}ω∈Ω
has strictly positive density on S and hence is atomless. Furthermore, we have the
following complete class theorem from Quah and Strulovici (2009).
16In this example, H is more Blackwell-informative than F if and only if ρh < ρ f .
17See Lehmann (1988) Theorem 3.1.
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Theorem (Quah and Strulovici, 2009, Theorem 4). Suppose {u(·,ω)}ω∈Ω is an IDO
family and {H(·|ω)}ω∈Ω is MLR-ordered. Then the set of monotone pure strategies Φ forms
an essentially complete class (among all the pure strategies).
Hence, it is without loss to focus on the monotone pure strategies Φ. Moreover, the
next result from Quah and Strulovici (2009) says the following: for any monotone pure
strategy under the less Lehmann-informative experiment, there exists another mono-
tone pure strategy under the more Lehmann-informative experiment, such that the
utility vector induced by the latter state-wise dominates that induced by the former.
Proposition (Quah and Strulovici, 2009, Proposition 9). Suppose {u(·,ω)}ω∈Ω is an
IDO family and H is more Lehmann-informative than F. Then for any monotone pure strategy
ψ : S 7→ A under F, there is a monotone pure strategy φ : S 7→ A under H such that, for all
ω ∈ Ω,
uH,φ(ω) ≥ uF,ψ(ω).
With these results, we have the “if” direction for the UAP case.
Corollary 1. Suppose the information structures H and F are MLR-ranked, and H is more
Lehmann-informative than F. Then for all uncertainty averse index G, and for all vNM utility
index u obeying the interval dominance order,
VUA(H, G, u) ≥ VUA(F, G, u). (3)
Proof. 18 Fix H, G and u. By Blackwell (1951b), Quah and Strulovici’s (2009) Theorem
4 and Proposition 9, pick any (mixed) strategy σ under F, there is a monotone pure
strategy ψ under F, and a monotone pure strategy φ under H such that
uH,φ(ω) ≥ uF,ψ(ω) ≥ uF,σ(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Since UEU(H,pi, φ, u) =
∫
Ω uH,φdpi and U
EU(F,pi, σ, u) =
∫
Ω uF,σdpi, we have
UEU(H,pi, φ, u) ≥ UEU(F,pi, σ, u), ∀pi.
Since G(·,pi) is increasing, the above statement implies
G(UEU(H,pi, φ, u),pi) ≥ G(UEU(F,pi, σ, u),pi), ∀pi,
which implies
min
pi∈∆Ω
G(UEU(H,pi, φ, u),pi) ≥ min
pi∈∆Ω
G(UEU(F,pi, σ, u),pi).
18We thank a referee who suggested this simpler proof.
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Since σ is chosen arbitrarily, we have
max
σ′∈(∆A)S
min
pi∈∆Ω
G(UEU(H,pi, σ′, u),pi) ≥ max
σ∈(∆A)S
min
pi∈∆Ω
G(UEU(F,pi, σ, u),pi).
Remark 1. Clearly, the same result in Corollary 1 applies to the family of vNM utility
indecies satisfying the single-crossing property, which is a special case of IDO.
Remark 2. An uncertainty-averse DM can often strictly benefit from mixing between
two equally attractive pure strategies, since the UAP utility functional is quasi-concave
(in the state-wise utility vector). Nevertheless, since in our setting signal distributions
are atomless, the set of state-wise utilities induced by all the pure strategies is convex,
thus (ex-post) mixing between any two equally attractive pure strategies does not
further benefit the DM.
4 More valuable implies more Lehmann-informative
In this section, we prove the "only if" direction of Lehmann’s equivalence theorem for
the UAP case, that is, Lehmann’s informativeness order can be equivalently defined
by comparing the induced values of experiments for UAP DMs with single-crossing
utility indices.
We first impose some technical assumptions on G. For any δ > 0, let ∆δ := {pi ∈ ∆Ω :
pi(ω) ≥ δ, ∀ω}.
Assumption 1. {G(·,pi)}pi∈M is uniformly equi-continuous on X .19
Assumption 2. (i) There exists some δ > 0 such that M ⊆ ∆δ. (ii) For all pi ∈ M, G(·,pi)
is strictly increasing. (iii) For all x ∈ X , G(x, ·) is continuous on M.
The main restriction of the two assumptions is M ⊆ ∆δ, which requires the set of
priors considered plausible by the DM must assign at least δ > 0 weight to every
state. See Section 6.1 for a discussion on how to interpret this requirement.
The next theorem says for any UAP DM with index G satisfying the two technical as-
sumptions, the induced value of an information structure characterized by the family
of single-crossing utility indices implies Lehmann’s order.
19See Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) Theorem 7.
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Theorem 1. Fix some uncertainty averse index G that satisfies Assumption 1 and 2. For any
information structures F and H that are MLR-ranked, if H is not Lehmann more informative
than F, then there exists a single crossing u such that
VUA(F, G, u) > VUA(H, G, u).
A sketch of the proof of Theorem 1, in several steps, is as follows.
Suppose H is not more Lehmann-informative than F.
1. In Proposition 1 in Section 4.2, for any prior pi with full support, we can explic-
itly construct a single-crossing index u (that depends on the prior pi) satisfying
VEU(H,pi, u) < VEU(F,pi, u).
2. The value of experiment F for a UAP DM is
VUA(F, G, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
min
pi∈∆Ω
G(UEU(F,pi, σ, u),pi). (4)
For each fixed u, after showing that Minimax Theorem holds for the problem in
(4), the maxmin value in (4) equals the minmax value, and thus can be obtainable
at some saddle point (σ∗,pi∗). Moreover, the set of saddle points, although
depending on u, is always convex and exchangeable.
3. We show there exists a particular pair pi∗, u∗ such that, (i) for such pi∗, u∗ satisfies
the requirement in the first step, and (ii) for such u∗, pi∗ is a part of some saddle
point (σ∗,pi∗) in the second step. The existence of such pair is proved using
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (see Lemma 3).
4. Since G(·,pi∗) is strictly increasing, the strict inequality found in the EU case at
pi∗ at u∗ can be passed on to the UAP case to get VUA(H, G, u∗) < VUA(F, G, u∗).
Theorem 1 characterizes Lehmann order for all pairs of experiments, by fixing a
uncertainty-averse index and varying all single-crossing vNM indices. Alternatively,
one can characterize the same information order by fixing a vNM index and varying
all uncertainty-averse indices. Theorem 2 below takes the other approach.
Definition 2. Suppose A = {a1, a2}. A finite collection of single-crossing utility in-
dices {u1, . . . , uI} satisfies diversity, if, for any pair of states ω < ω′, there exists some
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , I} such that
ui(a1,ω) > ui(a2,ω), ui(a2,ω′) > ui(a1,ω′).
11
Intuitively, diversity is violated if there exists a pair of states, ω′ < ω′′ such that for
every i, either ui(a1,ω) > ui(a2,ω) for both ω = ω′ and ω′′, or ui(a1,ω) < ui(a2,ω)
for both ω = ω′ and ω′′.
Theorem 2. Fix some finite collection of single crossing utility indices {u1, . . . , uI} that
satisfies diversity. For any information structures F and H that are MLR-ranked, if H is not
more Lehmann informative than F, then there exists some G ∈ G and ui from {u1, . . . , uI}
such that
VUA(F, G, ui) > VUA(H, G, ui). (5)
Proof. Suppose H is not Lehmann more informative than F, then by Lemma 1 (in
Section 4.2), there exists x¯, y¯ ∈ S and states ω < ω′ such that
H(x¯|ω) ≤ F(y¯|ω), H(x¯|ω′) > F(y¯|ω′).
Suppose A = {a1, a2}. Then by diversity of {u1, · · · , uI}, there exists some element ui
such that
ui(a1,ω) > ui(a2,ω), ui(a2,ω′) > ui(a1,ω′).
Fix this ui. Consider all the uncertainty-averse indices G that belong to EU family with
priors supported on {ω,ω′}. Then Theorem 2 becomes a case with EU preferences,
two-states, and two actions that are non-ordered with respect to u, which is proved in
Proposition 11 of Quah and Strulovici (2009).
Remark 3. Theorem 2 remains valid, if we focus on G that belongs to the EU family,
i.e.,
Gpi
0
(x,pi) =
{
x, if pi = pi0;
+∞, otherwise.
for all pi0 ∈ ∆(Ω). Since the inequality in (5) is strict, by continuity, we can further
require pi0 to be of full support.
Remark 4. For the collection of single crossing utility indices {u1, . . . , uI} to satisfy
diversity, I is at least (|Ω| − 1). For the binary state case, one such u suffices.
Remark 5. In the EU case with binary states, our Theorem 2 becomes Quah and
Strulovici’s (2009) Proposition 11. That is, for any fixed vNM utility index u, when-
ever H is not Lehmann more informative than F, one can construct some prior piu at
which the value of experiment F is strictly higher than that of H. In our Theorem
1 and Proposition 1, we consider any fixed prior pi with full support and construct a
specific form of vNM utility index upi for which the value of experiment F is strictly
higher than that of F when H is not Lehmann more informative than F.
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4.1 Binary state case
In this subsection we illustrate the connection between our Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
(and thus Quah and Strulovici’s (2009) Proposition 11) using the EU case with binary
states.
Consider the EU case with binary states {ω1,ω2}, and binary action A = {a1, a2}. Let
U be the class of vNM utility indices satisfying the following
U = {u|u(a1,ω1) > u(a2,ω1), u(a2,ω2) > u(a1,ω2)}.
To compare different experiments, without any loss of generality, we could restrict
the class on U .20 For any u ∈ U , define the ratio
χ(u) =
(
u(a1,ω1)− u(a2,ω1)
u(a2,ω2)− u(a1,ω2)
)
∈ (0,∞)
For this u, the prior belief on Ω to make the DM indifferent between a1 and a2 is given
by
(
1
1+χ(u) ,
χ(u)
1+χ(u)
)
.
Given pi and u, we define (Dpiu)(a,ω) = u(a,ω)pi(ω) as the prior-weighted utility.
Clearly, for any pi with full support, u ∈ U if and only if Dpiu ∈ U , moreover,
χ(Dpiu) = χ(u)
pi(ω1)
pi(ω2)
. (6)
We have two simple observations:21
(O1) Take u, u˜ ∈ U with χ(u) = χ(u˜), then for two experiments H1 and H2,
VEU(H1,pi, u) ≥ VEU(H2,pi, u) if and only if VEU(H1,pi, u˜) ≥ VEU(H2,pi, u˜).
(O2) Suppose Dpiu = Dpi
′
u′, then for any experiment H,
VEU(H,pi, u) = VEU(H,pi′, u′). (7)
20With binary actions and binary states, for any u, either a1 weakly dominates a2 for any ω, or a2
weakly dominates a1 for any ω, or u belongs to U , or belongs to U after relabeling actions. For the
former two cases, such u is useless to check informativeness of experiments. Note that any u ∈ U is
single crossing.
21See Appendix Section A.1 for the proofs. While O1 requires binary state assumption, O2 holds for
any finite state space.
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Observation 1 states that the threshold χ(u) is a sufficient statistic for comparing a
pair of experiments. Observation 2 states that, for the EU case, the prior-weighted
utility is a sufficient statistic for the value of any experiment.
Figure 2: χ(u)
Figure 3: χ(u˜)
The intuition for observation 1 can be illustrated by Figures 2 and 3. For fixed u, the
ranking of E1 and E2 is given by the expected values of a test function t(·), which is
the upper envelop of the linear expected utility functions of the posterior pi under a1
and a2. Figure 2 is a basic test function t(·) under our utility construction (by Equation
(8) below). Figure 3 is an arbitrary test function t˜(·) under a generic u˜ such that a1
and a2 are non-ordered. Suppose the two test functions have the exact same cutoff so
χ(u)
1+χ(u) =
χ(u˜)
1+χ(u˜) . Then, graphically, t˜(·) = l(·) + βt(·) for some linear function l(·) and
some scalar β > 0. Since for a fixed prior the ranking of two experiments is invariant
to such transformations, the two test functions will rank experiments the same way
as long as their cutoffs are the same.
These two observations are useful for connection our Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 (or
Quah and Strulovici’s (2009) Proposition 11).
In the proof of Theorem 1, we fix any prior pi1 and construct the following u1 with
u1(a1,ω1) = u1(a1,ω2) = 0, u1(a2,ω1) = −k, u1(a2,ω2) = 1− k. (8)
For any k ∈ (0, 1), such u1 ∈ U . Moreover, χ(Dpi1u1) = pi1(ω1)
pi1(ω2)
k
(1−k) , which can obtain
any positive number as k varies in (0, 1).
In our Theorem 2 (or Quah and Strulovici’s (2009), Proposition 11), for a fixed u2 in U ,
we vary the prior distribution pi2. By Equation (6), χ(Dpi
2
u2) can obtain any positive
number as the prior pi2 varies.
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For fixed u2 and pi1, the equation
χ(Dpi
1
u1) = χ(Dpi
2
u2) (9)
defines a one-to-one mapping between pi2 and k (in our construction of u1). This
equation (9) connects our Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 (Quah and Strulovici’s (2009)
Proposition 11).
Formally, let pi0 be the uniform prior, uˆ1 be Dpi
0
uˆ1 = Dpi
1
u1, and uˆ2 be Dpi
0
uˆ2 = Dpi
2
u2.
By Equation (9), χ(Dpi
0
uˆ1) = χ(Dpi
0
uˆ2). Then observation 1 implies
VEU(H,pi0, uˆ1) < VEU(F,pi0, uˆ1) if and only if VEU(H,pi0, uˆ2) < VEU(F,pi0, uˆ2).
Together with observation 2, we have
VEU(H,pi1, u1) < VEU(F,pi1, u1) if and only if VEU(H,pi2, u2) < VEU(F,pi2, u2).
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The formal result of the first step is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Fix an arbitrary prior pi of full support. For any information structures H
and F that are MLR-ranked, if H is not Lehmann more informative than F, then we can find
a vNM index u such that (1) u is single crossing; (2) u is uniformly bounded by 1; and (3)
VEU(H,pi, u) < VEU(F,pi, u).
The proof this proposition is in Appendix A.3.
The following lemma provides an equivalent statement of Lehmann’s order.
Lemma 1. H %L F if and only if for all x, y ∈ S, F(x|ω)− H(y|ω) is single crossing in ω.
The proof of this Lemma is in Appendix A.2.
Suppose H is not Lehmann more informative than F, by Lemma 1, there exists x¯, y¯ ∈ S
and state ω0 < ω1 such that 22
H(x¯|ω0) ≤ F(y¯|ω0), H(x¯|ω1) > F(y¯|ω1). (10)
22Another case of violation of Lehmann order is H(x¯|ω0) < F(y¯|ω0), H(x¯|ω1) ≥ F(y¯|ω1). The proof
is similar, hence omitted.
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Below we describe how the vNM index u in Proposition 1 is constructed.
Let A = {0, 1}. We will construct some u that satisfies the single-crossing property as
follows. Pick any ωˆ ∈ (ω0,ω1). Define a step function
ψ(ω) =
{
0 if ω ≤ ωˆ
1 otherwise
.
Clearly ψ is monotone, hence single crossing in ω. Define
g(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ {ω0,ω1},
e if ω /∈ {ω0,ω1}.
(11)
for some small e ∈ (0, 1). Obviously g is positive for any e > 0, and it is uniformly
bounded by 1. Now we define a utility function on A×Ω as
upie (a,ω) = a(ψ(ω)− kpie )g(ω), (12)
where upie is single crossing and kpie is chosen such that E[(ψ(ω)− kpie )g(ω))|X = x¯] =
0, with expectation taken with respect to H and prior pi. From the construction of k,
the optimal decision rule under H is to choose a = 1 if and only if x ≥ x¯. Clearly, kpie
lies in [0, 1].
After some calculations, we show that
VEU(F, upie ,pi)−VEU(H, upie ,pi) ≥ −2e+ (1− kpie )pi(ω1) [H(x¯|ω1)− F(y¯|ω1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 by (10)
(13)
As e → 0, the parameter kpie converges to some number in (0, 1), and hence the right-
hand-side term is strictly positive for small enough e. This proves Proposition 1.
We could further strengthen Proposition 1 by choosing a small e1 > 0 such that the
right-hand-side of (13) is still strictly uniformly positive for all pi ∈ ∆δ for some fixed
δ > 0. We denote upi := upie1/2 henceforth.
Now we move on to the second step, where we consider the UAP case:
VUA(F, G, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
min
pi∈∆Ω
G(UEU(F,pi, σ, u),pi). (4)
For a fixed utility upi, the next lemma verifies that we can turn our maxmin problem
into a minmax problem. This lemma utilizes the convexity of UAP, with which we
can apply Sion’s (1958) minimax theorem.
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Lemma 2. For all uncertainty-averse index G satisfying Assumption 1, fix any upi con-
structed in Proposition 1, we have
max
σ∈(∆A)S
min
p˜i∈∆Ω
G(UEU(F, p˜i, σ, upi), p˜i) = min
p˜i∈∆Ω
max
σ∈(∆A)S
G(UEU(F, p˜i, σ, upi), p˜i). (14)
For fixed pi and upi, denote by S(pi) the set of saddle points of (14). Clearly it is
nonempty for all pi ∈ ∆δ following Lemma 2. By Lemma 5 in Appendix A.6, S(pi)
has a product structure. Thus we can project the set of saddle points S(pi) to ∆Ω.
By Assumption 2, the projected area belongs to M ⊆ ∆δ. Hence, we can define a
correspondence Σ : ∆δ ⇒ ∆δ where
Σ(pi) := {p˜i∗ ∈ ∆δ|∃σ∗ ∈ (∆A)S such that (p˜i∗, σ∗) ∈ S(pi)}. (15)
Lemma 5 implies that S(pi) is convex for all pi ∈ ∆δ. Since Σ(pi) is the projection
of S(pi) to ∆δ, it is nonempty and convex.23 The continuity of G(UEU(F, p˜i, σ, upi), p˜i)
in pi implies Σ is upper hemi-continuous.24 By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (see
Appendix A.7), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then correspondence Σ has a fixed point in
∆δ.
Now, we present the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let pi∗ ∈ ∆δ be a fixed point of the correspondence Σ. Then it
could be used simultaneously to construct upi
∗
and be part of a saddle point for the
maxmin problem (14) using upi = upi
∗
. Let σ∗ be the mixed strategy component of
this saddle point. By definition, σ∗ maximizes utility at pi∗. Then,
VUA(F, G, upi
∗
) = G(UEU(F,pi∗, σ∗, upi
∗
),pi∗) (16)
= G(VEU(F,pi∗, upi
∗
),pi∗) (17)
> G(VEU(H,pi∗, upi
∗
),pi∗) (18)
= max
σ∈(∆A)S
G(UEU(H,pi∗, σ, upi
∗
),pi∗) (19)
≥ min
pi
max
σ∈(∆A)S
G(UEU(H,pi, σ, upi
∗
),pi) (20)
= VUA(H, G, upi
∗
). (21)
23The full statement of Lemma 5 shows additional properties, such as a product structure, of the set
S(pi), which could be of independent interest. Hence, it is relegated to Appendix A.6.
24Recall that from the construction of upi in (12), the value kpie depends continuously on both pi and
e. As discussed above, one can pick some e(δ) = e1/2(δ) that works uniformly for all pi ∈ ∆δ. Put
together, we have that upi and hence G(UEU(F, p˜i, σ, upi), p˜i) are continuous in pi for all pi ∈ ∆δ.
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Here (16) uses the fact that pi∗ ∈ Σ(pi∗) and (σ∗,pi∗) is a saddle point for the maxmin
problem with F, upi
∗
; (17) and (19) follow from G(·,pi∗) is (strictly) increasing; (18)
follows from that G(·,pi∗) is (strictly) increasing, as well as the "only if" direction of
Lehmann’s equivalence theorem in the EU case (Lemma 4 in appendix A.4); and (21)
uses the minimax equation from Lemma 2.
Remark 6. Lehman’s original proof showed that, for a fixed u, if H is not more
Lehmann-informative than F, then there exists some prior pi (supported at the two
points ω0 and ω1 found at condition (10)) such that the expected value of F is higher
than H. Here we want to prove that for any fixed prior with full support, there exists
some u where the expected value of F is strictly higher than H. To bridge the dif-
ference, we multiply the payoff function by a g : Ω 7→ (0, 1] function (11) that shifts
most of the weight to ω0,ω1. We can do so because the single-crossing property of
the original payoff function is preserved after being multiplied by a strictly positive
function g. The parameter e > 0 can be arbitrarily small but not zero, as otherwise u
is no longer single crossing.25
Remark 7. A challenge in proving Theorem 1 is that the minimizing prior pi∗ identified
in (4) depends on the vNM index u, yet in step one the construction of u (rendering
a strictly higher value for F) also depends on the initial prior pi. A coincidence of
pi∗ = pi is required here. So if Σ is a correspondence mapping from an initial prior pi
to the index u constructed in the first step and further from u to the set of minimizing
priors from the second step, then pi∗ should be a fixed point of Σ. The existence of
such a fixed point is obtained by applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
5 Applications
5.1 Social ranking of experiments
A society consists of I individuals. Each i has a single-crossing vNM index ui. We
consider a social planner’s aggregation problem, where she knows the individuals’
risk preferences but does not know their uncertainty-averse indices (in particular,
their prior beliefs). The social risk preference profile, (u1, . . . , uI), is called diverse, if
the collection {u1, . . . , uI} satisfies diversity.
25Formally, pick any positive function g, i.e., g(ω) > 0 for any ω. Suppose u(a,ω) is single crossing,
then u(a,ω)g(ω) is also single crossing. However, if u(a,ω) is supermodular, u(a,ω)g(ω) may not be
supermodular. The proof is straightforward, hence omitted.
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Suppose information structures F and H are MLR-ranked. Say individual i prefers H
to F, H %i F, if
VUA(H, G, ui) ≥ VUA(F, G, ui), ∀G ∈ G.
Say the society unanimously prefers H to F, if H %i F for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , I}.
Corollary 2. Suppose the social risk preference profile is diverse. Pick two arbitrary informa-
tion structures F and H that are MLR-ranked, H is Lehmann more informative than F if and
only if the society unanimously prefers H to F.
Proof. The statement follows directly from Theorem 2.
As an immediate implication of Corollary 2, two societies with different compositions
of risk preferences can have the same social ranking of experiments, as long as the
risk preference profiles in these societies both satisfy diversity.
5.2 Investment decisions
Next we will apply our result to an investment problem studied by Bond (2016). 26
An uninformed (individual) investor is making an investment decision, where ω ∈
Ω ⊆ R is a payoff relevant state such that the expected return of investment is in-
creasing in ω. The state space Ω is assumed to be compact. This uninformed investor
cannot directly observe ω; he infers ω from some economic outcome a that is, in this
case, the investment decision made by an informed (institutional) investor who ob-
serves the state. The decision a depends on the state ω and some unobserved random
variable, t ∼ U[0, 1], that is irrelevant to the uninformed investor’s decision. After
observing a, the uninformed investor makes an investment decision b ∈ B ⊆ R. His
payoff from decision b in state ω is uU(b,ω).
The informed investor directly observes ω and chooses an investment level a. She
is the beneficiary of a government bailout policy—with probability 1 − ψ ∈ [0, 1],
the government bails out this investor if her investment project fails. Let (1 + r) be
the gross return of the investment when it succeeds, and 0 is the gross return of the
investment when it fails. The probability of success is
q(ω,ψ) = ω+ (1−ω)(1− ψ),
26We examine the first model in Bond (2016) to illustrate how our result is applicable. The same
analysis can be applied to the other two models studied there.
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where ω ∈ [0, 1] is the actual success rate of the investment without bailout, and
conditional on failure there is a (1− ψ) probability of bailout. Assume ωr ≥ 1 for all
ω. The informed investor’s vNM index is uI(c; t) with monetary outcome c and some
parameter t. Her problem is
max
a
q(ω,ψ)uI(ar; t) + (1− q(ω,ψ))uI(−a; t),
Corollary 3. Suppose the informed investor is an EU maximizer and the uninformed in-
vestor is uncertainty averse with index G. Assume that the uninformed investor’s vNM index
uU(b,ω) satisfies (i) uU is continuous in b and satisfies the single-crossing property in (b,ω);
(ii) For any b′′ > b′, uU(b′′,ω)− uU(b′,ω) is quasi-concave in ω. The informed investor’s
vNM index uI(·, t) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies ∂∂t
(
uIcc
uIc
)
< 0. Then a
higher bailout probability makes the uncertainty-averse uninformed investor worse off.
Proof. By Proposition 4 in Bond (2016), a higher probability of bailout reduces the
Lehmann-informativeness of the informed investor’s action a. Then the result follows
from our Corollary 1.
6 Discussion
6.1 Assumption 2
Recall that M is a closed and convex subset of ∆Ω that includes all the priors in the
domain of G. In Section 4, we have assumed M ⊆ ∆δ for the "only if" direction of
Lehmann’s equivalence theorem.
According to Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), M is interpreted as the set of priors the
DM considers relevant. The set is identified behaviorally as follows: take the initial
preference relation % over all Anscombe-Aumann acts, which satisfies all the axioms
of UAP, and let the partial order %∗ be the subset of % on which the independence
axiom holds. Then f %∗ g is interpreted as f is unambiguously preferred to g. This
order %∗ admits a Bewley representation, i.e., there is some vNM index u (unique
up to a positive affine transformation) and a unique closed and convex set of priors
C ⊆ ∆Ω such that
f %∗ g⇔
∫
Ω
u( f )dpi ≥
∫
Ω
u(g)dpi ∀pi ∈ C
for all acts f , g. Hence C is naturally interpreted as the revealed ambiguous priors by
an UAP agent. By Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), C = cl(dom∆(G)) = M.
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Assumption 2(i) requires that every relevant prior must assign at least a probability δ
to each state, where δ > 0 is a uniform lower bound. This assumption is stronger than
requiring all relevant priors to have full support, since it rules out the case that M is
the set of all priors with full support. Nevertheless, since the number of states is finite
and δ can be arbitrarily small, we still consider it as a relatively mild assumption.
6.2 Alternative proofs with weaker assumptions
Regrettably, our Theorem 1 does not apply to multiplier preferences (Hansen and
Sargent, 2001; Strzalecki, 2011), an important sub-family of UAP:
VMP(H,pi0, θ, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
min
pi∈∆Ω
UEU(H,pi, σ, u) + θR(pi||pi0),
where R(pi||pi0) is the relative entropy of pi with respect to pi0 ∈ ∆δ and θ ∈ (0,+∞].
This is because the proof relies on the assumption that M ⊆ ∆δfor some δ > 0, yet for
the multiplier preferences M = ∆. Hence a weaker assumption can be desirable for
certain subfamilies of UAP.27
In this section, we provide alternative proofs for the “only if” direction for smooth
preferences and SOEU cases, which relax Assumption 2 and use a different technique.
Smooth preferences
The proof uses an idea similar to the proof in the paper by Li and Zhou (2016) for
the Blackwell ranking case. The main technique is to scale down uniformly the vNM
utility index, and, provided that the scale parameter is sufficiently small, any local
change in state-dependent utility vector would lead to a first order change in risk
premium but only a second order change in ambiguity premium.
For the smooth preferences (Klibanoff et al., 2005), the value takes the following form:
VS(H, µ, φ, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
φ−1
(∫
∆Ω
φ(UEU(H,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)
)
,
where µ ∈ ∆(∆Ω) and φ : R 7→ R is a continuous, strictly increasing and concave
function.
27Assumption 1 always holds for the six special families considered.
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Proposition 2. For smooth ambiguity case, assume that pi0 :=
∫
∆(Ω) pidµ(pi) is of full
support, φ is strictly concave, then the implication of Theorem 1 holds: i.e., there exists a
single crossing utility u such that the value under H is strictly smaller than that under F:
VS(H, µ, φ, u) < VS(F, µ, φ, u).
The proof is given in Appendix A.8.
SOEU
Recall that for second order expected utility (Grant et al., 2009),
USO(H,pi0, φ, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
φ−1
(∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
,
where φ : R 7→ R is some continuous, concave, and strictly increasing function. When
φ(z) = z, we are back to the EU case.
Proposition 3. For SOEU case, assume that the prior pi0 is of full support, φ is strictly
concave, then the implication of Theorem 1 holds: i.e., there exists a single crossing utility u
such that the value under H is strictly smaller than that under F:
VSO(H,pi0, φ, u) < VSO(F,pi0, φ, u).
The proof is quite similar to that of Proposition 2. We scale down the utility index
appropriately to make sure that the result for the EU case carries over to the SOEU
case. When u is sufficiently small, the state-dependent utility vector can only vary
within in a small neighborhood around 0, which corresponds to the case of local
ambiguity neutrality. See Appendix A.9 for the proof.
Recall that for multiplier preferences,
VMP(H,pi0, θ, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
min
pi∈∆Ω
UEU(H,pi, σ, u) + θR(pi||pi0),
where R(pi||pi0) is the relative entropy of pi with respect to pi0 ∈ ∆δ and θ ∈ (0,+∞].
Note that MP is a special case of SOEU with
φθ(x) =
{
− exp (− xθ ) for 0 < θ < ∞,
x for θ = ∞.
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the multiplier preferences to have full support.
The next corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.
Corollary 4 (Multiplier preferences case). For multiplier preferences, assume that the ref-
erence prior pi0 is of full support, then the implication of Theorem 1 holds: i.e., there exists a
single crossing utility u such that the value under H is strictly smaller than that under F:
VMP(H,pi0, θ, u) < VMP(F,pi0, θ, u). (22)
6.3 Six special cases
Uncertainty-averse preferences nest the following six well-known ambiguity averse
preferences as special cases (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011). Previously, we have dis-
cussed three special families: smooth preferences, SOEU preferences, and multiplier
preferences. The remaining three special cases are:
1. Maxmin EU (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), where for some convex and closed
set C ⊆ ∆Ω, VM(H, C, u) = maxσ∈(∆A)S minpi∈C UEU(H,pi, σ, u).
2. Variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006), where for
some convex, lower-semi continuous, and grounded cost function c : ∆(Ω) 7→
[0,∞], VV(H, c, u) = maxσ∈(∆A)S minpi∈∆Ω UEU(H,pi, σ, u) + c(pi).
3. Confidence preferences (Chateauneuf and Faro, 2009). If range(u) = R|Ω|×|A|+ ,
then VC(H, φ, α, u) = maxσ∈(∆A)S min{pi:φ(pi)≥α} 1φ(pi)U
EU(H,pi, σ, u) for some con-
fidence level α ∈ (0, 1) and some quasi-concave and upper semi-continuous con-
fidence function φ : ∆(Ω) 7→ [0, 1].
Corollary 5. Lehmann’s equivalence results hold for the following preference families, with
Assumption 2 taking specified form:
1. Maxmin EU (MEU), with C ⊆ ∆δ;
2. Variational preferences (VP), with dom(c) ⊆ ∆δ and c(·) being continuous on dom(c);
3. Multiplier preferences (MP), with pi0 ∈ ∆δ;
4. Confidence preferences (CP), with {pi : φ(pi) ≥ α} ⊆ ∆δ and φ being continuous on
{pi : φ(pi) ≥ α};
5. Smooth preferences (SP), with pi0 :=
∫
∆(Ω) pidµ(pi) ∈ ∆δ and φ being strictly concave;
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6. Second-order expected utility (SOEU), with pi0 ∈ ∆δ and φ being strictly concave.
Proof. The "if" direction follows directly from Corollary 1. For the "only if" direction,
note that Assumption 1 is clearly satisfied in all six special cases. The cases of SP,
SOEU, and MP follow from Propositions 2, 3, and Corollary 4. The MEU, VP, and CP
cases follows from Theorem 1 and a straightforward adaption of Assumption 2.28
6.4 Relation to the literature
The Blackwell’s informativeness order can be characterized by comparing the value of
information of two experiments by an expected utility maximizing DM, for all vNM
utility indices. This dual characterization motivates several studies to identity finer
ranking of Blackwell by either restricting the set of utility functions, and/or the set
of experiments. For example, among pairs of MLR-ranked experiments, Lehmann
(1988) considers utility indices that are quasi-concave in action with optimal actions
(“peaks”) that are increasing in the state;29 Athey and Levin (2018) study supermod-
ular vNM indices; and Quah and Strulovici (2009) explore the most general family of
interval dominance order vNM indices (IDO-family).
Another direction is to re-evaluate the comparative value of experiment by assuming
that the DM is not expected utility maximizer, but exhibits ambiguity aversion. For ex-
ample, assuming commitment and allowing for all vNM indices, Çelen (2012) shows
the same ranking holds for maxmin EU, and Li and Zhou (2016) further generalize
it to all uncertainty-averse preferences, thus showing the robustness of Blackwell’s
informativeness ranking.30
This paper lies in the intersection of the two directions. To derive the richer informa-
tion ranking, we restrict to the family of single-crossing vNM utility indices; and to
examine robustness of Lehmann’s ranking, we generalize the ex-ante value of infor-
mation to almost all uncertainty-averse preferences. Again, our results confirm that
28More precisely, the corresponding conditions for Assumption 2 are listed as follows:
- For Maxmin EU, X = R and G(x,pi) =
{
x, if pi ∈ C;
+∞, otherwise.
and C ⊆ ∆δ.
- For VP, X = R and G(x,pi) = x + c(pi); we assume dom(c) ⊆ ∆δ and c is continuous on dom(c).
- For CP, X = R+ and G(x,pi) =
{
x
φ(pi)
, if φ(pi) ≥ α;
+∞, otherwise.
; we assume {pi : φ(pi) ≥ α} ⊆ ∆δ and φ is
continuous on {pi : φ(pi) ≥ α}.
29Also see the monotone decision class studied by Karlin and Rubin (1956).
30See also Gensbittel et al. (2015) for a discussion on the ambiguous information case.
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the characterization of Lehmann’s ranking depends crucially on the single-crossing
(or similar) property of risk preferences but is robust to varying assumptions regard-
ing uncertainty preferences.
It is worth noting that the “only if” direction may fail when preferences are not convex.
For example, for a decision maker who perceives extreme ambiguity about ω and
views every prior in ∆Ω as possible, and moreover she is optimistic and evaluates a
strategy by the best-case scenario. Then any two experiments have the same value to
her for any utility function. Therefore the convexity of UAP is necessary.
6.5 Information orders and prior belief
In this subsection, we present a simple observation to explain why Blackwell’s order
and Lehmann’s order are prior-free. Within the EU framework, the value of a decision
problem depends on the vNM utility index u and the experiment available. The com-
parison of experiments can be reflected by comparing the values on certain subsets of
vNM utility indices.
Fixing a prior pi, for given set of vNM utility indices U∗, we can define a partial order
U∗ on experiments such that:
H U∗ F ⇐⇒ max
σ
UEU(H,pi, σ, u) ≥ max
σ
UEU(F,pi, σ, u), for all u in U∗. (23)
For any u, for any positive function g¯ : Ω → R+ = (0,∞), define a new vNM utility
index ug¯ such that ug¯(a,ω) := u(a,ω)g¯(ω) for any a,ω.
Definition 3. A set of utility indices U∗ are called closed under state-wise weighting, if
u ∈ U∗ implies ug¯ ∈ U∗ for any positive function g¯.
Proposition 4. Assume U∗ is closed under state-wise weighting, then U∗ does not depend
on the choice of pi as long as pi is of full support.
Suppose we take U∗ = Uall as the set of all vNM utility indices, which is clearly
closed under state-wise weighting. The corresponding rank is exactly Blackwell’s
informativeness order. On the other hand, suppose we take U∗ = Usc as the set of all
single-crossing vNM utility indices, it is easy to check that the single-crossing utility
family is also closed under state-wise weighting (see footnote 25). The corresponding
ranking is exactly Lehmann’s order. By Proposition 4, both partial orders must be
prior free. Similarly, if U∗ = Uido, the set of all IDO vNM utility indices (Quah and
Strulovici, 2009), it is also closed under state-wise weighting. By Proposition 4, the
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corresponding rank is also prior free. In fact, both Uido and Usc induce the same
partial order on experiments, i.e., the Lehmann’s order.
However, if the information partial rank U∗ defined in (23) is prior dependent, then
the set of utility indices U∗ can not be closed under state-wise weighting. For example,
Athey and Levin (2018) use U∗ = Uspm, the set of all supermodular vNM utility
indices to define an order on experiments called MIO-ND.31 Since supermodularity
is not preserved under state-wise weighting, MIO-ND is indeed prior dependent.
Therefore applying this order MIO-ND requires knowledge of the prior belief.
Also, it is necessary that pi is of full support, otherwise g¯ is either not well-defined, or
not positive valued.
Remark 8. Consider U∗ = {u0}∪Usc, where u0 is an (arbitrary) element in Uido\Usc. By
construction, this U∗ is clearly not closed under state-wise weighting. Since both Usc
and Uido induce Lehmann’s order, the induced ranking U∗ is also Lehmann’s order,
hence prior-free. As shown by this example, the reverse implication of Proposition 4
does not always hold.
6.6 Dynamically consistent updating rule
So far we have focused on the ex-ante value of information for a DM who can commit.
In this subsection we show that our main results also apply to an UAP agent who
only makes decisions ex-post but follows some dynamically consistent updating rule
(Hanany and Klibanoff, 2009).
Fix an experiment (S, H). A prior pi ∈ ∆(Ω) induces a joint density p(s,ω) =
h(s|ω)pi(ω) in the product space S × Ω, i.e., p ∈ ∆(S × Ω). Let pi·s ∈ ∆Ω denote
its Bayesian posterior conditional on event {s} ×Ω. Denote by ∆H(S×Ω) the set of
joint probabilities induced by H and all priors pi.
Let % be the ex-ante UA preference we considered, which has UAP representation
(G˜, u) with G˜ naturally extended from G to domain X × ∆(S × Ω).32 Let σ∗ be
an ex-ante optimal strategy from the set (∆A)S. A conditional event is {s} × Ω.
31MIO-ND stands for "Monotone Information Order for payoff functions with NonDecreasing incre-
mental returns", see Athey and Levin (2018).
32More precisely, G˜ : X × ∆(S×Ω) 7→ (−∞,+∞] is obtained from G through the following:
G˜(x, p) =
{
G(x,pi), if there exists pi such that p(s,ω) = h(s|ω)pi(ω), ∀s,ω;
+∞, otherwise.
See Li and Zhou (2016) footnote 8.
26
Let {%s,σ∗}s∈S denote the conditional preferences system with UAP representation
{(Gs,σ∗ , u)}s∈S derived from some updating rule.
The DM follows some dynamically consistent updating rule if for any ex-ante optimal
σ∗, conditionally σ∗ %s,σ∗ σ for all σ such that σ = σ∗ on S\{s}.
Following Hanany and Klibanoff (2009), we consider the set of probabilities support-
ing the conditional optimality of σ∗ in (∆A)S,i.e., 33
Qs,σ
∗
=
{
p ∈ ∆H(S×Ω)|
∫
S×Ω
∫
A
udσ∗s′dp ≥
∫
S×Ω
∫
A
udσs′dp, ∀σ = σ∗ on S\{s}
}
.
Let Qs,σ
∗
s ⊆ ∆Ω be the set of Bayesian posteriors of Qs,σ∗ conditional on event {s}×Ω.
Clearly, if the DM is dynamically consistent then our main results extend to the case
without commitment.
Corollary 6. For a given optimal strategy σ∗ under H, the DM follows some dynamically
consistent updating rule if for all signal s ∈ S,
arg min
pis∈∆Ω
Gs,σ∗
(∫
Ω
∫
A
udσ∗s dpis,pis
)
∩Qs,σ∗s 6= ∅. (24)
For any pair of experiments H and F that are MLR-ranked, suppose (24) holds for the optimal
strategies under both H and F. Then the results in Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 extend to the
case of no commitment.
Proof. The first part follows from Proposition 4.1 in Hanany and Klibanoff (2009). The
rest follows from the definition of dynamic consistency.
7 Conclusion
This paper considers the ex-ante value of information for DMs who are uncertainty
averse but has the ability to commit. We find that under weak technical assumptions,
classic characterization of Lehmann’s order is robust to consideration of uncertainty-
averse agents. This suggests broader applicability of Lehmann’s order for economic
problems with payoff complementarity.
33Since we assume H has strictly positive density, p({s} ×Ω) > 0.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of the two observations in Section 4.1
Proof. (1) Let Pi, i = 1, 2, be the distribution of the posterior beliefs given experiment
Hi and the prior pi. By Bayes’ rule, P1 and P2 have the same mean that equals the
prior, i.e., ∫
xdP1(x) =
∫
xdP2(x).
For a given u, let t(·) the highest expected utility for a given posterior belief x ∈ [0, 1],
i.e.,
t(x) = max
a∈A
((1− x)u(a,ω1) + xu(a,ω2)).
The value of experiment H for such u is
VEU(Hi,pi, u) =
∫
t(x)dPi(x)
Since there are only two actions, t(x) is a piece-wise linear, convex function of x with
a unique kink at χ(u)1+χ(u) , so
t(x) = l(x) + βmax
(
0, x− χ(u)
1+ χ(u)
)
,
where l(x) is linear in x, and β is a positive scalar (See Figure 2 for an example of
t(·)).
As a consequence,
VEU(H1,pi, u)−VEU(H2,pi, u) = β
∫
max
(
0, x− χ(u)
1+ χ(u)
)
d(P1(x)− P2(x)).
Similarly,
VEU(H1,pi, u˜)−VEU(H2,pi, u˜) = β˜
∫
max
(
0, x− χ(u˜)
1+ χ(u˜)
)
d(P1(x)− P2(x)).
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Recall that β, β˜ are both positive. So when χ(u) = χ(u˜),
VEU(H1,pi, u) ≥ VEU(H2,pi, u) if and only if VEU(H1,pi, u˜) ≥ VEU(H2,pi, u˜).
So, we show Observation O1.
(2) For the second Observation, note that the value of information structure H is
VEU(H,pi, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
UEU(H,pi, σ, u) = max
σ∈(∆A)S
∫
Ω
∫
S
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)dH(s|ω)dpi(ω).
If Dpiu = Dpi
′
u′, then u(a,ω)pi(ω) = u′(a,ω)pi′(ω) for any a,ω. From the above iden-
tity, it is clearly true that VEU(H,pi, u) = VEU(H,pi′, u′), which shows Observation
O2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Recall T is defined by H(T(x,ω)|ω) = F(x|ω). Pick any x, y ∈ S, define
∆x,y(ω) := F(x|ω)− H(y|ω) = H(T(x,ω)|ω)− H(y|ω).
For all x, y ∈ S, ∆x,y(·) is single crossing in ω if and only if for any ω1 > ω0,
H(T(x,ω0)|ω0) ≥ (>)H(y|ω0) implies H(T(x,ω1)|ω1) ≥ (>)H(y|ω1). The latter
is equivalent to T(x,ω1) ≥ T(x,ω0), i.e., T(x, ·) is increasing, which is exactly the
definition of H %L F.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To distinguish two signals, we use X and Y to denote the signal space associated with
experiment H and F, respectively. A typical element is denoted as x ∈ X, y ∈ Y.
Suppose H is not Lehmann more informative than F, by Lemma 1, there exists x¯ ∈
X, y¯ ∈ Y and state ω0 < ω1 such that
H(x¯|ω0) ≤ F(y¯|ω0), H(x¯|ω1) > F(y¯|ω1). (25)
Pick any ωˆ ∈ (ω0,ω1). Now we consider a special function ψ(ω) =
{
0 if ω ≤ ωˆ
1 otherwise
.
Clearly ψ is monotone in ω.
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Define
g(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ {ω0,ω1},
e if ω /∈ {ω0,ω1},
(26)
for e ∈ (0, 1). Obviously g is positive for any e > 0, and it’s uniformly bounded by 1.
Consider
h(ω) = (ψ(ω)− k)g(ω),
which can be shown to be single crossing in ω.34
For such single-crossing h(ω), let A = {0, 1}, define a utility function on A ×Ω as
upie (a, θ) = ah(ω) = a(ψ(ω)− kpie )g(ω). Clearly, u satisfies the single-crossing prop-
erty. By the MLR property, the function E[h(ω)|X = x] is increasing in x following
Quah and Strulovici (2009). And kpie is chosen such that
E[h(ω)|X = x¯] = E[(ψ(ω)− k)g(ω))|X = x¯] = 0,
where the conditional expectation is taken using H and the prior pi. Such k always
exists by setting kpie =
E[ψ(ω)g(ω))|X=x¯]
E[g(ω))|X=x¯] ∈ [0, 1].
An optimal decision rule for this u := upie under signal X is given by the following
indicator function:
d∗(x) = 1{E[h(ω)|X=x]≥0} =
{
1 if E[h(ω)|X = x] ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
with expected payoff
VEU(H,pi, u) :=
∫
Ω
∫
X
u(d∗(x),ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω) =
∫
Ω
∫
X
1{E[h(ω)|X=x]≥0}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω).
(27)
Similarly, for signal Y, we define the optimal strategy d∗(y) in the similar way, we
have:
VEU(F,pi, u) :=
∫
Ω
∫
Y
u(d∗(y),ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω) =
∫
Ω
∫
Y
1{E[h(ω)|Y=y]≥0}h(ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω)
≥
∫
Ω
∫
Y
u(d0(y),ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω) =
∫
Ω
∫
Y
1{y≥y0}h(ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω). (28)
for any y0 ∈ Y. Here the inequality follows from the fact that the decision rule
d0(y) = 1{y≥y0} is clearly a feasible strategy, but may not be optimal.
34It means that, for all ω′′ > ω′, h(ω′) ≥ (>)0 implies h(ω′′) ≥ (>)0.
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From equation (27), we have:
VEU(H,pi, u) =
∫
Ω
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω), (29)
as 1{E[h(ω)|X=x]≥0} = 1{x≥x¯} from the construction of k.
By setting y0 = y¯ in (28), we have
VEU(F,pi, u) ≥
∫
Ω
∫
Y
1{y≥y¯}h(ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω). (30)
Consider the integration in (29), we can break the integration into two pieces.∫
Ω
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω) (31)
=
∫
ω∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω) +
∫
ω/∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω).
On the set ω /∈ {ω0,ω1}, the integrand is bounded by
|1{x≥x¯}h(ω)| = |1{x≥x¯}(ψ(ω)− k)g(ω)| ≤ e,
as |ψ(ω)− k| ≤ 1. Therefore,
|
∫
ω/∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω)| ≤
∫
ω/∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
X
|1{x≥x¯}h(ω)|dH(x|ω)dpi(ω)
≤
∫
ω/∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
X
edH(x|ω)dpi(ω) ≤ e. (32)
Therefore,∫
Ω
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω) ≤
∫
ω∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω) + e.
(33)
Similarly,∫
Ω
∫
Y
1{y≥y¯}h(ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω) ≥
∫
ω∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
Y
1{y≥y¯}h(ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω)− e. (34)
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As a result,
VEU(F,pi, u)−VEU(H,pi, u)
≥ −2e+
(∫
ω∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
Y
1{y≥y¯}h(ω)dF(y|ω)dpi(ω)
)
−
(∫
ω∈{ω0,ω1}
∫
X
1{x≥x¯}h(ω)dH(x|ω)dpi(ω)
)
= −2e+ (h(ω0)[1− F(y¯|ω0)]pi(ω0) + h(ω1)[1− F(y¯|ω1)]pi(ω1))
− (h(ω0)[1− H(x¯|ω0)]pi(ω0) + h(ω1)[1− H(x¯|ω1)]pi(ω1))
= −2e+ h(ω0)pi(ω0) [H(x¯|ω0)− F(y¯|ω0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ h(ω1)pi(ω1) [H(x¯|ω1)− F(y¯|ω1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Recall that h(ω0) = (0− k)g(ω0) = −kpie ≤ 0 and h(ω1) = (1− kpie )g(ω1) = (1− kpie ) ≥
0. Therefore,
VEU(F,pi, u)−VEU(H,pi, u)
≥ −2e− kpie pi(ω0) [H(x¯|ω0)− F(y¯|ω0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+(1− kpie )pi(ω1) [H(x¯|ω1)− F(y¯|ω1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ −2e+ (1− kpie )pi(ω1) [H(x¯|ω1)− F(y¯|ω1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (35)
Notice that in the above expression, the parameter k depends on the choice of e. When
e→ 0, k converges to some number in (0, 1).35 By continuity, there exits a e1 > 0 small
enough , such that
V(F,pi, u)−V(H,pi, u) > 0, for all e ∈ (0, e1]. (37)
This finishes the proof. 
A.4 Lemma 4
Define
Q(e,pi) = −2e+ (1− kpie )pi(ω1)[H(x¯|ω1)− F(y¯|ω1)], (38)
35in the limit as e→ 0, the kpie converges to
Pr[(ω > ω¯)|X = x¯,ω ∈ {ω0,ω1}]. (36)
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for e ∈ [0, 1], pi ∈ ∆.
Proposition 1 can be strengthened using the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Fixing δ > 0, there exists e1 > 0 and c > 0 such that for any e ∈ [0, e1] and
pi ∈ ∆δ,
Q(e,pi) ≥ c > 0, ∀e ∈ [0, e1], ∀pi ∈ ∆δ. (39)
Proof of Lemma 4. Clearly Q is continuous as kpie is continuous in both e and pi. Fixing
δ > 0, recall ∆δ := {pi ∈ ∆Ω : pi(ω) ≥ δ, ∀ω}.
Define
m(e) := inf
pi∈∆δ
Q(e,pi) = min
pi∈∆δ
Q(e,pi).
(The min exists as ∆δ is compact.) By the theorem of maximum, m is continuous in e.
When e = 0, for any pi ∈ ∆δ, pi(ω1) ≥ δ and lime→0 kpie < 1. As a result, Q(0,pi) > 0.
Therefore, m(0) > 0. By continuity, the lemma follows.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
To show Lemma 2, we need a general Minimax Theorem by Sion (1958).
Theorem 3 (Sion 1958, Theorem 3.4). Let M and N be convex, compact spaces, and f a
function on M× N, quasi-concave-convex and u.s.c.-l.s.c.36 Then
sup
µ∈M
inf
ν∈N
f (µ, ν) = inf
ν∈N
sup
µ∈M
f (µ, ν).
Proof. Fix upi, we define a function G˜ : (∆A)S × ∆Ω 7→ (−∞,+∞] as
G˜(σ, p˜i) := G(UEU(F, p˜i, σ, upi), p˜i).
Note M := {p˜i ∈ ∆Ω : domG(·, p˜i) = X} is the subset of p˜i ∈ ∆Ω where G(·, p˜i) is
not constant at +∞. Recall M := {p˜i ∈ ∆Ω : domG(·, p˜i) = X}. By assumption, it
is without loss to restrict on G˜ : (∆A)S × M 7→ R, where (∆A)S and M ⊆ ∆Ω are
convex and compact subspaces.
36A real-valued function f on M × N is quasi-concave-convex if it is quasi-concave in M and quasi-
convex in N. A real-valued function f on M× N is u.s.c.-l.s.c. if f (·, ν) is upper semi-continuous in µ
for each ν ∈ N and f (µ, ·) is lower semi-continuous in ν for each µ ∈ M.
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For any p˜i, G˜(·, p˜i) := G(UEU(F, p˜i, ·, upi), p˜i) is quasi-concave because the linear EU
functional UEU(F, p˜i, ·, upi) is quasi-concave and G(·, p˜i) is increasing. For any σ,
G˜(σ, ·) := G(UEU(F, ·, σ, upi), ·) is quasi-convex because UEU(F, ·, σ, upi) is linear in
σ and G is quasi-convex. Thus G˜ is quasi-concave-convex.
Moreover, since G(·, ·) is lower-semi-continuous on X × ∆Ω and U(F, S, ·, σ) is linear
in p˜i, G˜(σ, ·) is lower-semi-continuous on ∆Ω. Note that {G(·, p˜i)}p˜i∈M is uniformly
equicontinous on X and U(F, S, p˜i, ·) is linear on (∆A)S, hence G˜(·, p˜i) is continuous
on (∆A)S.
Hence all the conditions of Sion’s Minimax Theorem are met.
A.6 Lemma 5
In this appendix, we discuss an interesting property of the set of saddle points. Con-
sider a general quasi-concave-convex function f : X × Y 7→ R that is upper semi-
continuous (u.s.c.) in x and lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) in y, where X and Y are
some compact and convex spaces. The set of saddle points S is defined as
{(x∗, y∗) : f (x, y∗) ≤ f (x∗, y∗) ≤ f (x∗, y) ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y}.
By Sion’s Minimax Theorem, S is nonempty. Then, let X∗ and Y∗ be the projection of
S onto X and Y, respectively. The next lemma says that any selection of x∗ ∈ X∗ and
y∗ ∈ Y∗ forms a saddle point. That is, the set of saddle points has a product structure.
Lemma 5. Let f : X×Y 7→ R be a quasi-concave-convex and u.s.c.-l.s.c. function defined on
some compact and convex spaces X and Y. Let S ⊆ X × Y be the set of saddle points. Then
there are some nonempty and convex subsets X∗ ⊆ X and Y∗ ⊆ Y such that S = X∗ × Y∗.
Moreover, f (x∗, y∗) = V¯ for all (x∗, y∗) ∈ X∗ ×Y∗.
Proof. Recall that S is defined as
{(x∗, y∗) : f (x, y∗) ≤ f (x∗, y∗) ≤ f (x∗, y) ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y}.
Non-emptiness of S is given by Sion’s Minimax Theorem. Pick any two saddle points
(x∗1 , y
∗
1) and (x
∗
2 , y
∗
2) from S. Let X
∗ and Y∗ be the projection of S onto X and Y,
respectively. Then for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y,
f (x, y∗1) ≤ f (x∗1 , y∗1) ≤ f (x∗1 , y), (40)
f (x, y∗2) ≤ f (x∗2 , y∗2) ≤ f (x∗2 , y). (41)
34
Then, by setting y = y∗2 in the third term in (40) and x = x∗1 in the first term in (41),
and setting x = x∗2 in the first term in (40) and y = y∗1 in the third term in (41), we
have
f (x∗1 , y
∗
1) ≤ f (x∗1 , y∗2) ≤ f (x∗2 , y∗2) ≤ f (x∗2 , y∗1) ≤ f (x∗1 , y∗1). (42)
Observe that f attains the same minimax value at the four pairs in (42). Let this value
be V¯.
Also, for all x, y, combining (40) and (42) yields
f (x∗1 , y
∗
2) ≤ f (x∗1 , y∗1) ≤ f (x∗1 , y),
and combining (41) and (42) yields
f (x, y∗2) ≤ f (x∗2 , y∗2) ≤ f (x∗1 , y∗2).
Thus the “exchanged” pair (x∗1 , y
∗
2) is also a saddle point. By the same argument,
(x∗2 , y∗1) ∈ S.
In light of this, it suffices to show that X∗ and Y∗ are convex. Pick any α ∈ (0, 1), let
x∗α = αx∗1 + (1− α)x∗2 and y∗α = αy∗1 + (1− α)y∗2 . For all x, y, by definition f (x∗1 , y) ≥ V¯
and f (x∗2 , y) ≥ V¯ and by quasi-concavity of f (·, y)
f (x∗α, y) ≥ min{ f (x∗1 , y), f (x∗2 , y)} ≥ V¯ ∀y ∈ Y.
Similarly f (x, y∗α) ≤ V¯ for all x ∈ X. Hence
f (x, y∗α) ≤ f (x∗α, y∗α) = V¯ ≤ f (x∗α, y).
So the convex combination (x∗α, y∗α) is also a saddle point.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For pi ∈ ∆δ, define
fpi(σ, p˜i) := G(UEU(F, p˜i, σ, upi), p˜i).
Since Ω is finite, ∆δ is a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of R|Ω| space. For all
pi, by Lemma 5, S(pi) is nonempty and convex.
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Take pin → pi and p˜in ∈ Σ(pin). Then there exists σn where (σn∗, p˜in∗) ∈ S(pin) so that
fpin(σ, p˜in∗) ≤ fpin(σn∗, p˜in∗) ≤ fpin(σn∗, p˜i), ∀p˜i, σ. (43)
Since (∆A)S and ∆δ are compact, there exists some subsequence {(σnk∗, p˜ink∗)}nk of
{(σn∗, p˜in∗)}n that converges to some (σ∗, p˜i∗). Sending nk → +∞, because upi and
hence fpi(σ, p˜i) varies continuously with pi, fpi(·, p˜i) is continuous, and fpi(σ, ·) is con-
tinuous on M, (43) implies ∀p˜i, σ:
fpi(σ, p˜i∗) = limnk
fpink (σ, p˜i
nk∗) ≤ lim
nk
fpink (σ
nk∗, p˜ink∗) ≤ lim
nk
fpink (σ
nk∗, p˜i) = fpi(σ∗, p˜i),
therefore (σ∗, p˜i∗) ∈ S(pi). Hence p˜i∗ ∈ Σ(pi) and the correspondence Σ is upper-
hemi-continuous. For any fixed pi, repeat the above argument with pin = pi implies
Σ(pi) is closed and hence compact. By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, Σ has a fixed
point.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose (6) holds, then, since pi0 is of full support, using the result for the only if case
for the EU case, we can construct a single-crossing utility index v(a,ω) such that
max
σ
UEU(H,pi0, σ, v) < max
σ
UEU(F,pi0, σ, v). (44)
Define δ := maxσ UEU(F,pi0, σ, v) −maxσ UEU(H,pi0, σ, v). Clearly δ is positive by
construction. For any e > 0, we define u := ev, which is also single crossing and
satisfies (44). Next we show that for small enough e, this u will do the job.
Assume φ(0) = 0 and φ′(0) = 1. This is WLOG because φ(·) is unique up to a positive
affine transformation.37 Let M0 := maxa,ω |v(a,ω)|. We first claim that there exists a
positive constant M1 such that
|φ(t)− t| ≤ M1t2, ∀t ∈ [−M0, M0].
(For example, pick M1 = 12 maxt∈[−M0,M0] |φ′′(t)|.)
For any strategy σ and any e ∈ (0, 1), |UEU(H,pi, σ, u)| ≤ maxa,ω |u(a,ω)| = emaxa,ω |v(a,ω)| =
37We assume φ is twice continuously differentiable around 0.
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eM0, therefore
|max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
φ(UEU(H,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)−max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(H,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi)| (45)
≤ max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
|φ(UEU(H,pi, σ, u))−UEU(H,pi, σ, u)|dµ(pi) (46)
= max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
M1(eM0)2dµ(pi) = M1(eM0)2.
Similarly,
|max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
φ(UEU(F,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)−max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(F,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi)| (47)
≤ M1(eM0)2. (48)
Moreover, by linearity of UEU in pi, we have∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(H,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi) = UEU(H,
∫
∆(Ω)
dµ(pi), σ, u) = UEU(H,pi0, σ, u),
for any σ. As a result,
max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(H,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi) = max
σ
UEU(H,pi0, σ, u) = emax
σ
UEU(H,pi0, σ, v).
(49)
Similarly, we have
max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(F,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi) = emax
σ
UEU(F,pi0, σ, v). (50)
Let
e¯ := min
(
1,
δ
2M1M20
)
> 0.
Pick any e satisfying 0 < e < e¯. Then by the triangular inequality and equations
37
(45)–(50), we have
max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
φ(UEU(H,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)−max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
φ(UEU(F,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi) (51)
≤ max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(H,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi)−max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(F,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi)
+|max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
φ(UEU(H,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)−max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(H,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi)|
+|max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
φ(UEU(F,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)−max
σ
∫
∆(Ω)
UEU(F,pi, σ, u)dµ(pi)|
≤ −e (max
σ
UEU(F,pi0, σ, v)−max
σ
UEU(H,pi0, σ, v))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δ
+M1M20e
2 + M1M20e
2
= −e(δ− 2M1M20e) < 0. (52)
Then for u = ev, we have
max
σ
φ−1
(∫
φ(UEU(H,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)
)
< max
σ
φ−1
(∫
φ(UEU(F,pi, σ, u))dµ(pi)
)
.

Remark 9. The proof proceeds exactly as that of Theorem 1, except that here we con-
struct a single crossing utility index using a different method. A similar method was
used by Li and Zhou (2016).
A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose (6) holds, then, since pi0 is of full support, using the result for the only if case
for the EU case, we can construct a single-crossing utility index v(a,ω) such that
max
σ
UEU(H,pi0, σ, v) < max
σ
UEU(F,pi0, σ, v). (53)
Define δ := maxσ UEU(F,pi0, σ, v) −maxσ UEU(H,pi0, σ, v). Clearly δ is positive by
construction. For any e > 0, we define u := ev, which is also single-crossing, and
satisfies (53). Next we show that for small enough e, this u will do the job.
Assume φ(0) = 0 and φ′(0) = 1. This is WLOG because φ(·) is unique up to a positive
affine transformation.38 Let M0 := maxa,ω |v(a,ω)|. We first claim that there exists a
38We assume φ is twice continuously differentiable around 0.
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positive constant M1 such that
|φ(t)− t| ≤ M1t2, ∀t ∈ [−M0, M0].
(For example, pick M1 = 12 maxt∈[−M0,M0] |φ′′(t)|.)
For any strategy σ and any e ∈ (0, 1), for any signal s ∈ S and state ω ∈ Ω,
|
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)| ≤
∫
A
eM0dσs(a) = eM0,
therefore
|φ(
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a))− (
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a))| ≤ M1(eM0)2. (54)
Therefore, for any strategy σ,
|
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)|
≤
∫
Ω
∫
S
|φ(
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a))− (
∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a))|dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
≤
∫
Ω
∫
S
M1(eM0)2dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω) = M1(eM0)2. (55)
Similarly, ∀σ, we have,
|
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)|
≤ M1(eM0)2.
Let e¯ := min
(
1, δ
2M1 M20
)
> 0. Then for any e satisfying 0 < e < e¯, we have
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)d0pi(ω)−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)d0pi(ω)
=
(
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
+
(
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
+
(
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
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By equation (56), the first term satisfies(
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
≥ −max
σ
|
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)|
≥ −M1M20e2.
Similarly, by equation (55), the second term satisfies(
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
≥ −M1M20e2.
And the third term is(
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
= emax
σ
UEU(F,pi0, σ, v)− emax
σ
UEU(H,pi0, σ, v) = eδ.
As a consequence,
max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
−max
σ
∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
≥ −M1M20e2 −M1M20e2 + eδ = e(δ− 2M1M20e) > 0.
Then for this u = ev, we have
max
σ
φ−1
(∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dF(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
> max
σ
φ−1
(∫
Ω
∫
S
φ
(∫
A
u(a,ω)dσs(a)
)
dH(s|ω)dpi0(ω)
)
,
which concludes the proof. 
A.10 Proof of Proposition 4
Given two interior priors pi and pi′, define a positive function g¯ as g¯(ω) = pi(ω)/pi′(ω).
40
For any strategy σ, from the definition of value of information, the following holds:
UEU(H,pi, σ, u) = UEU(H,pi′, σ, ug¯), ∀u. (56)
Similarly, for information structure F,
UEU(F,pi, σ, u) = UEU(F,pi′, σ, ug¯), ∀u.
Consider the mapping ψg¯ by mapping each u to ug¯. Since U∗ is closed under state-
wise weighting, the image of this mapping on U∗ is also in U∗. In fact, this mapping is
one to one and onto, and hence defines a bijection on U∗. The inverse of this mapping
is defined by 1/g¯. In particular, for any u, define u˜ = u1/g¯, then it is easy to check
that u˜g¯ = u. By (56),
max
σ
UEU(H,pi, σ, u) ≥ max
σ
UEU(F,pi, σ, u), for all u in U∗,
if and only if
max
σ
UEU(H,pi′, σ, ug¯) ≥ max
σ
UEU(F,pi′, σ, ug¯), for all u in U∗,
if and only if
max
σ
UEU(H,pi′, σ, u) ≥ max
σ
UEU(F,pi′, σ, u), for all u in U∗,
where the last step follows from the fact that {u : u ∈ U∗} = {ug¯, u ∈ U∗}. The result
just follows. 
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